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Abstract  
The political brinkmanship of the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam has been 
illustrated vividly by the way in which it brought forward its proposals for an Interim
Self-Governing Authority by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the United National 
Front Government. In the proposals the LTTE articulated its political intentions in 
concrete constitutional terms for the first time. The Proposals rationalize the armed 
struggle and a contractual agreement outside the Constitution. The plenary powers of 
the ISGA exceed the federal formula; effectively exclude the institutions of the state 
of Sri Lanka from the North-East; and clear the route for a separate state. This 
situation demands a redirection of the peace process which requires a clear political 
vision and a proper strategy with alternative proposals on the part of the government. 
In the face of present impasse of the peace process the challenges before the new 
Freedom Alliance government are formidable.nic conflict, peace process, interim proposals, negotiations 
odern History, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka and Visiting  Research 
e of Developing Economies, Japan 
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 Preface 
After six rounds of peace talks with the Sri Lankan government, the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) unilaterally decided to withdraw from the peace talks in 
April 2003.  All the attempts made on the part of the Norwegian facilitators and other 
international players including Japan to bring the LTTE back to the negotiating table had 
been failed. The LTTE had adamantly refused even to attend the Tokyo Conference on the 
Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka held in June 2003.  It appeared that the Sri 
Lankan Peace Process had been frozen on the brink.  The LTTE, meanwhile, successfully 
maneuvered the desperate United National Front government to present three sets of 
proposals for an interim arrangement one after another and rejected them all.  In turn, the 
LTTE presented its own proposals for an interim administration in November 2003 and 
emphasized that hereafter any future peace talks must be based on their proposal for an 
Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA).  In presenting these proposals the LTTE for the 
first time articulated its political intentions in concrete constitutional terms.   The LTTE 
proposals on ISGA have, quite naturally, attracted worldwide attention and raised many 
questions about the future direction of the peace process in Sri Lanka. This article intends 
to trace, firstly, the politico-historical genealogy of the idea of interim administration in the 
discourse of peace in Sri Lanka.   With this backdrop it will closely read the contents of the 
proposed ISGA of the LTTE to trace their underlying political overtones.  Final part will be 
devoted to discuss the challenges that the Sri Lankan peace process would face in reaching 
a negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict in the next phase of dialogue with the LTTE. 
 
Indo-Sri Lanka Peace accord and Interim Arrangement 
The issue of an interim period/administration in the discourse of peace-building process 
in Sri Lanka first emerged in the context of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987.  It set 
provisions for an interim period beginning from the temporary merger of the Northern and 
Eastern provinces until the proposed referendum in the Eastern Province which was 
expected to give the people in the Eastern Province an opportunity to decide whether the 
Province remains merged or de-merged.  Soon after the signing of the accord, an 
arrangement was made to set up an Interim Administration with the participation of the 
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 LTTE.  It was agreed to give seven slots to the LTTE in the twelve-member interim council.  
Later on, however, disagreements emerged between the Sri Lankan government and the 
LTTE over the headship of the administration.  In no time the settlement forged by the 
Accord collapsed and the LTTE took up arms against the Indian Peace Keeping Force.  The 
proposed interim administration did not take off the ground. 
 
Peace Initiatives of the People’s Alliance Government and Interim Formula 
It should be noted that the issue of interim administration did not formally crop up 
during the brief period of dialogue and truce between the Peoples’ Alliance (PA) 
government and the LTTE soon after the new government assumed power in August 1994.    
In the initial phase of dialogue the PA government unilaterally decided to setup a 
Presidential Task Force for Rehabilitation in the North. Even though the LTTE did not 
directly bring up the issue of setting up of an interim council when one analyses the long 
trail of correspondence between the President and the LTTE leader, it is not difficult to 
comprehend that the LTTE was gradually setting the background for the demand for an 
interim administration.  From the very beginning of the dialogue the LTTE was 
emphasizing the need for ‘returning to normalcy’, ‘addressing the urgent day-to-day 
problems’ of people before embarking on a serious dialogue on any substantive political 
issues which the PA government emphasized.  In his letter addressed to Minister Anurudda 
Ratwatte, dated 8.12 1994, the LTTE leader accused the PA government that:  
‘Though the government delegation pledged ‘to alleviate the hardships 
of daily life presently experienced by the people’, no action has taken so 
far to redress the grievances of our people.  The urgent problems of our 
people can not be reduced to ‘some reconstruction and repair works’. 
There are far more pressing problems, which have to be resolved to 
create genuine conditions of peace and normalization of civilian life in 
the war torn areas’.1   
The next logical step in this framework of argument of the LTTE would be the emphasis on 
the need for a proper administrative mechanism to discharge the responsibility of attending 
‘the hardship of daily life’ and ‘the urgent problems of our people’. The LTTE was not in 
agreement with the parallel approach which the PA government was emphasizing.  Before 
                                                 
1 Letter of V. Pirabakaran,addressed to Col. Anuruddha Ratwatte, dated 1994 
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 reaching the point of discussing the issue of appropriate mechanism to address the urgent 
day-to-day problems, the dialogue and the truce collapsed.  By giving the first ultimatum 
that they ‘be compelled to make a painful decision’,  Pirabakaran in his letter to the 
President dated 16.3.1995 stated ‘(I)n our several communications addressed to you during 
the last six months and during the peace negotiations we have been consistently reiterating 
the urgency of resolving the immediate day to day problems of our people.  Our insistence 
on these issues should not be misconstrued as attempts to by-pass discussions on 
fundamental political issues underlying the ethnic conflict’2.  As the talks between the PA 
government and the LTTE collapsed in April 1995 before making any head way in 
negotiations, the idea of interim administration did not surface at all.   
 
Both the first version of the Devolution Proposals of the PA government in August 
1995 and the Proposals for a New Constitution of October 1997 were silent on an interim 
administration.  It was during the subsequent long process of multi-tiered discussions with 
the Tamil Parties and the Muslim Congress on these proposals that the issue of an interim 
administration once again came up.  The Constitutional Proposals of October 1997 have 
introduced a series of referenda to determine the unit of devolution in the North and East. 
In the subsequent discussions with the Tamil political parties it was felt that an interim 
process was necessary untill the unit of devolution was finally determined after these 
referenda under the new constitution.  At the discussions between the PA and the UNP on 
the constitutional proposals an agreement was reached to have an interim council for the 
North and East for a period of five years, appointed by the President among nominations by 
political parties and independent groups with due consideration to the ethnic composition 
and administrative districts of the North and East.  Once again, after the long consultation 
with the Tamil Parties, it was decided to extend the period of interim administration from 
five to ten years, the five years of nominated Interim Council followed by another five 
years of an elected Regional  Council.  The agreed provisions on the establishment of an 
interim council were included in the Chapter XXVII of the ill-fated ‘Draft Bill (N0.372) to 
Repeal and Replace the Constitution of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.’ 
                                                 
2 Letter of V. Pirabakaran,addessed to the President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, dated 16.3.1995.  
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While the inter-party consultations were in process the President made an arrangement to 
set up an Advisory Council for the Northern and Eastern provinces by promulgating an 
Emergency Regulation under the Public Security Ordinance. The Gazette Extraordinary 
issued on November 2, 1999 provided for an Advisory Council consisting of eleven to 
seventeen members appointed by the President to advise the Governor in regard to the civil 
administration and maintenance of law and order in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. 
Despite a gazette notification, in the light of the lukewarm response from other Tamil 
political parties, let alone the opposition of the LTTE, appointments to the council were 
never made. Hence, the Advisory Council never saw the light of the day in actual practice.       
 
Peace Initiative of the UNF Government and the Interim Administration   
The issue of setting up of an interim administration for the North and East figured in the 
understanding between the UNP and the LTTE, even prior to the General Elections in 2001.  
After the withdrawal of the LTTE from the Peace Talks, Anton Balasingham recalled, in 
his letter dated 21 May 2003 addressed to Vidar Helgesen, that ‘Originally the idea of an 
interim administrative structure for the Northeast was mooted by the LTTE months before 
the last general elections.  The UNP leadership endorsed the proposal and the Prime 
Minister Mr. Ranil Wickramasinghe openly campaigned in support of an interim 
administrative structure with the active participation of the LTTE”.3  The Election 
Manifesto of the UNF stated that it would set up an interim administration.  It was a brief 
reference and no details were given in relation to the conditions or powers to be vested with 
it.  The faltered peace process appeared to have received a new lease of life after the UNF 
assumed power in December 2001.  Soon after the UNF assumed power the LTTE 
unilaterally declared a ceasefire and the UNF government responded positively. The 
removal of street check points, cancellation of cumbersome authorization permits for the 
movement of the people and goods created an optimistic mood throughout the country. 
‘Agreement on a Ceasefire between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic 
                                                 
3 Letter of Anton Balasingham addredd to Vidar Helgesen, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Royal Norwegian 
Government, dated 21.5.2003. 
 6
 and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’ was signed on 22 February 2002. The 
Agreement made no reference to an interim arrangement. 
 
It was expected that direct peace talks between the UNF government and the LTTE 
would soon follow the Ceasefire Agreement.  In responding to the concerns of the delay, 
Minister G.L. Peiris assured in the cabinet press briefing on 27 March that ‘peace talks will 
be held in the first week of May 2002’. At this point the LTTE brought the issue of interim 
administration.  In April the LTTE laid down four conditions to commence talks: the lifting 
of the LTTE ban, lifting the economic embargo in the uncleared areas, setting up an interim 
administration in the North-East for two years and lifting fishing restrictions.  In this 
context, in May 2002, the UNF government announced a series of constitutional change as 
part of the 18th amendment to the constitution which was considered to be a prerequisite for 
any move to setup an interim administration for the North and the East.  Minister G.L Peiris 
was reported to have stated that ‘the government was in consultation with the opposition 
members to secure the two thirds majority in parliament required for the amendments to 
become law’4.  The peace talks did not take place in May despite Minister G.L Peiris’ 
assurances.  The UNF government was under high pressure to deliver goods as promised.  
But the LTTE was not keen to commence the peace negotiations.  The situation began to 
change after Minister Milinda Moragoda had discussions with Anton Balasingham in 
London on 27 July 2002.  This was the first direct meeting between a Minister of the Sri 
Lankan Government and the Chief LTTE Negotiator, Anton Balasingham.  At this pre-Talk 
discussion held at the Norwegian Ambassadorial residence in London the question of an 
interim administration was discussed for the first time in addition to the issues regarding 
the implementation of the Ceasefire agreement and preparation of direct talks in Thailand.  
Once again the Minister Milinda Moragoda and Anton Balasingham  met in Oslo on 
August 145. This was a continuation of the first meeting and the parties decided to 
commence formal talks in Thailand between 22 and 27th of September.  A day after the 
announcement of dates for Peace Talks, BBC World Edition reported:  ‘Asked by 
                                                 
4 People’s Daily - Beijing (English edition), May 24, 2002. 
5 In addition to the Minister Moragoda and Balasingham, Bernard Gunatilake, Adela Balasingham, Vidar 
Helgesen, Eric Solheim, Jon Wesborg and Lisa Golden attended the discussions. 
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 journalists how the government had convinced the Tamil Tigers it could actually implement 
any political solution, Professor G.L. Peris said “ I told you we will change the constitution 
so we will do it and show them that we can do it. That is the best way of proving that one 
can do it’.6                 
 
 Those who anticipated that the LTTE would demand an interim administration at 
the first round of Peace Talk held in Sattahip, Thailand were taken by surprise when the 
LTTE agreed to establish a Joint Task Force for Humanitarian and Reconstruction 
Activities. Instead of raising the issue of interim administration, at the talks the parties 
expressed ‘their willingness to work together towards the establishment of a provisional 
administrative structure for the North and East’. According to the Agreement at the first 
session, at the second round of peace talks held in Thailand during the period from 31 
October to 3 November, parties took steps to establish a Sub-committee on Immediate 
Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN). 
 
      In October 2002, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka struck down the two 
constitutional amendments initiated by the UNF government. The court declared that the 
conscience clause of the 19th Amendment is unconstitutional and the provisions for 
reducing powers of the President relating to the dissolution of Parliament needs two-thirds 
majority in the Parliament and approved by the people in a national referendum. After the 
Supreme Court judgment the environment of the peace talks began to change.   The 
changed atmosphere was reflected when  the LTTE announced its decision to withdraw 
from the Sub-committee on De-escalation and Normalization after the 4th Round of Talks 
held in Thailand held on January 6-9, 2003. The 5th and 6th Rounds of Talks held in Berlin 
and Hakone respectively did not make any new initiatives and the talks appeared to have 
bogged down over the issue of High Security Zones (HSZ).  Meantime, the SLMM made a 
proposal for preventing incidents between the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) and the LTTE at sea 
where it proposed to ‘recognize the LTTE Sea Tigers as a de facto naval unit’, to demarcate 
areas at sea for ‘live firing exercise’ by Sea Tigers and ‘neither SLN nor the LTTE Sea 
                                                 
6 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2195289.stm 
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 Tigers will conduct offensive or aggressive operations and movements at sea’. The SLN 
strongly rejected the SLMM proposal.  In April 21st Anton Balasingham informed the 
Prime Minister the decision of the LTTE to suspend its participation in the negotiations for 
time being. He further stated that the LTTE leadership has decided not to participate in the 
international donor conference to be held in Japan in June. 
 
It is true that immediately behind the LTTE withdrawal was the exclusion of LTTE 
from the preparatory aid conference in Washington. However, in addition to the exclusion 
from the Washington conference, Balasingham mentioned continuous suffering and 
hardships experienced by internally displaced peoples (IDPs) and deprivation and 
marginalization of Tamils in the macro economic policies and strategies of the government 
as reasons for the LTTE withdrawal. In this letter he did not make any reference to interim 
administration. The Washington aid conference was more in the nature of a seminar and the 
LTTE decision was really a calculated move taken after a thorough strategic analysis on its 
part.   It became evident to the LTTE that international involvement in the process, 
especially in the international donor confab, would result in creating conditions and 
obligations to the LTTE too.  Still they were not ready for it.  Hence, the LTTE wanted to 
avoid conveniently any situation that compels it to be a signatory/party to an international 
declaration that emphasizes and endorses ‘effective promotion and protection of human 
rights of all people, norms against the recruitment of child solders, the recognition of  
diversity in the East and parallel process towards a final political settlement’.  At the same 
time, the LTTE capitalized on the situation to achieve international recognition by creating 
conditions for international actors to come and beg the LTTE to participate in the Tokyo 
aid conference. The LTTE strategy worked well.  Subsequent to the LTTE decision, many 
internationally reputed diplomats went to the Wanni jungles and waited in the queue to 
meet the LTTE hierarchy to urge them to attend the conference. 
 
The demand of an ‘interim administrative structure with adequate powers to 
undertake North-Eastern re-construction and development activities’ was brought to the 
focus by Pirabakaran once again on 15 May 2003 when he met Norwegian Foreign 
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 Minister Jan Peterson when he went to the Wanni jungles to persuade the LTTE to attend 
the Tokyo aid confab.  With no time the UNF governments responded to the LTTE demand 
by proposing a North East Development and Reconstruction Council. The Government 
response was spelt out in three separate documents--a Draft Agreement, an informal paper 
on ‘Elements of a strengthened and Expanded Mechanism for Development of North and 
East’ and a letter suggesting the use of locally elected bodies as a basis for development 
activities. In his letter dated 21st may 2003, Balasingham flatly rejected the UNF 
government’s proposals and urged the Prime Minister to respond to the LTTE proposal for 
an interim administration and urged ‘to establish a new innovative structure for the 
reconstruction and development in the North and East.  Nevertheless, he kept  issues open 
and stated: ‘A positive and constructive response from the Prime minister setting out his 
ideas and proposals in clear and concrete terms will certainly help our leadership to take a 
crucial decision on the resumption of peace talks and participation at the donor conference 
in Japan’.  Being so impatient about getting LTTE participation in the Tokyo donor confab, 
the UNF government presented another set of proposals on 27th May 2003, in response to 
the LTTE request for ‘the establishment of a new innovative structure’. In this proposal 
‘regarding Administrative and Financial Arrangements to Expedite Efficient 
Implementation of Programmes and Projects Relating to Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Development in the North East’ the Government offered a three layered structure with ‘a 
Apex Body (Council) for decision making in regard to all immediate and medium term 
rehabilitation, reconstruction and development work in the North East and advising on 
policy development’7     Just  in 48 hours the LTTE rejected the second set of proposals 
claiming that  it was far short of its expectations.  In his letter to the Prime Minister dated 
May 30, 2003 Balasingham further stated  
…our sense of equal partnership in peace building and reconciliation 
suffered a severe blow when the main international and regional players 
continued to treat the LTTE shabbily as a proscribed entity with a 
terrorist label to be excluded from international forums.  We are also 
concerned over the growing involvement in the peace process of 
                                                 
7 The Sunday Times, 1 June 2003.  
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 international ‘safety net’ to bring undue pressure on the freedom of our 
people to determine their political status and destiny8
 
The subtle diplomacy of the Norwegian and Japanese peace envoys to bring the LTTE to 
the Tokyo aid confab bore no fruits and it took place as scheduled without the LTTE 
participation. In the face of the intransigency of the LTTE the peace process seemed struck 
in limbo.  In this context, on 17 July 2003, the UNF government presented its third 
proposal- ‘Provincial Administrative Structure for the Northern and Eastern Province’.  
The government claimed that the new proposals were basic ‘discussion document’ aimed at 
drawing at LTTE response. Legal and constitutional advisors of LTTE met in Paris in mid-
September and again in the Northern Ireland to chart out their responses.  The LTTE 
response was the presentation of its desired version of an interim administration- ISGA.  
The chronology of events clearly reveals how the UNF government unwittingly played in 
the hands of the LTTE because of its apparent desire to link the peace process to its own 
political survival while ignoring all the calls from the President for a bi-partisan approach. 
   
Contents of the Proposals and their political Overtones  
 ISGA proposal is a well structured and carefully crafted document to indicate in no 
uncertain terms the type of interim arrangement the LTTE wanted in line with its future 
political objectives. It is prefaced with a long preamble and it provides the conceptual 
foundations, the political philosophy, the framework and parameters for the proposed 
Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA).  The Preamble is utilized to rationalize the 
armed struggle and a contractual arrangement to set-up an Interim Self-Governing 
Authority.  Therefore, it is necessary to read the paragraphs detailing out the ISGA in the 
light of its preamble. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
8  TamilNet, May 30,2003.  
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 Rationalization of the Armed Struggle and Contractual Agreement  
Outside the Constitution  
The reference to the ‘right of self determination of peoples’ in the opening 
paragraph of the preamble is very significant because of its political implications.  The 
often-quoted ‘Oslo Declaration’ issued after the Third Round of Talks only referred to ‘the 
principle of internal self-determination’.  The difference of the two concepts with and 
without the prefix internal is significant.  The concept of self-determination is a highly 
contested and evolving one.  Since the Principle of Self-determination of Peoples was 
incorporated into the Charter of the United Nations it has been subjected to different 
interpretations and even at the United Nations General Assembly there were two 
resolutions, one defining it in terms of the de-colonization (1514 (XV)) and the other in 
terms of representative government formula (2625 (XXV)).  However, the term ‘internal 
self-determination’ is relatively more precise.  It denotes regional self rule within the 
parameters of the overall sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, i.e. a high degree 
of devolution of power on territorial or non-territorial basis.  Implicit in this paragraph, and 
also in other sections of the text, is an attempt to define the Tamil ethnicity in Sri Lanka as  
‘peoples’ in line with UN General Assembly Resolutions and other international 
instruments such as the Helsinki Declaration and the Charter of Paris.  At the same time no 
reference what so ever to the territorial integrity is noticeable in the proposal.   
 
 Their use of arms (‘armed struggle’) against the state has been rationalized ‘as a 
measure of self-defense and as a means of the realization of Tamil right to self-
determination.’   However, the LTTE raised arms against the populace in the North and 
East including the Muslims, other Tamil political parties and the democratically elected 
Tamil political leaders too.  More importantly, the preamble attempts to justify the interim 
arrangement based on an agreement between the LTTE and Sri Lankan Government even 
outside the constitution.  In this respect the last two paragraphs of the preamble are 
particularly important. It proposes the reliance on ‘international precedents for establishing 
interim governing arrangements in war-torn countries having the force based solely on 
pacts or agreements between the warring parties recognized by the international 
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 community’.  Very interestingly it quotes the Ceasefire Agreement, the Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) as valid precedents.  
 
 The main Text of the Proposals details out the proposed contractual arrangement 
between the UNF Government to set up the ISGA.  Even though the establishment of an 
interim authority arising out of such contractual arrangement outside the constitution is 
rationalized on the basis of international precedents, the international experiences in setting 
up of interim authorities based on contractual arrangement between the warring parties 
outside the constitution reveals that it is possible only in the failed states where the 
legitimate institutions of power and governance ante are collapsed completely.  By way of 
constructing the background to this claim, the LTTE proposal refers to Sri Lanka only as an 
empty geographical space, in the politico-judicial sense, where the erection of any structure 
based on a contractual arrangement could be justified. It is not a simple faux pas that the 
Republic of Sri Lanka, the sovereign politico-judicial entity recognized by the international 
community in the island of Sri Lanka, has never been mentioned in the document.       
 
 There is no reference to any sort of framework of the solution to the ethnic problem 
in the ISGA proposals.  The parameters of the interim arrangement can only be decided in 
relation to the framework of a possible final solution to the ethnic problem. The ethnic 
conflict is not simply a conflict between the ethnic groups.  At the root of the ethnic conflict 
is the discord over the structure of the state and the exercise of political power.  Any 
interim arrangement must facilitate the final solution.  Once interim authority is established 
it is the interim process that decides the subsequent political development.  When it is set 
up without an agreed framework of a post-conflict settlement, the interim arrangement 
itself would decide the parameters of final settlement. Hence, an open-ended interim 
arrangement without any linkages to a framework of final political settlement may end up 
only as a respite for another phase of the armed conflict.  The LTTE proposal maintains 
that ‘reaching a final negotiated settlement and the implementation thereof is expected to 
be a long process’ and interim arrangement is necessary to carry out reconstruction work.  
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 Constitutionality and Democracy  
 It is not possible at all to be silent on the issue of constitutionality of the ISGA, 
although the Constitution is not a sacrosanct document.  If the Constitution is found to be 
an obstacle in reaching a lasting solution it could be amended or replaced with a new one, 
openly with a mandate from the people.  It is a basic tenet in the democratic political 
practice. Any attempt to ignore the constitution or to forge a contractual arrangement over 
and above the existing constitutional framework will have serious political repercussions.  
The opening paragraph of the preamble refers to the principle of the rule of law.  The 
constitution is considered to be the supreme law of the state.  The whole issue of 
constitutionality could be satisfactorily addressed if the interim arrangement comes as an 
integral part of a final settlement. The Provisions for Interim Administration in the 13th 
Amendment to the Constitution and the Interim Council in the Constitution Bill of August 
2000 can be cited as examples for having an interim administrative authority set up as an 
integral part of a final settlement.  
 
 There is no room for any other stakeholders except the marginal niche carved out 
for the Muslims in the ISGA- a contractual arrangement only between the UNF 
Government and the LTTE.  In the present context, it may be practicable for the LTTE to 
have a lion’s share, if other conditions are fulfilled, in the proposed interim arrangement, 
but the room for different voices must be opened up by incorporating all the stakeholders 
through democratic content and practice. 
 
Purview of the Proposed ISGA 
The purview the ISGA has been presented in such a way that one could interpret it 
in its own way.  It says ‘the urgent need of the people of the northeast by formulating laws 
and policies and, effectively and expediently executing all resettlement, rehabilitation, 
reconstruction and development in the Northeast’.  In the first part of the paragraph, the 
purview and areas where laws and policies are formulated are not specified.  The second 
part refers to ‘resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development’ but the powers 
that are proposed to be vested with the ISGA far exceed the satisfactorily discharging of the 
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 task.  In the main text of the proposal, the jurisdiction of the ISGA is defined as ‘plenary 
powers of governance of the northeast’. Further more, it will include ‘control over all the 
marine and offshore resources of the adjacent seas and the power to regulate access thereto’.  
The term ‘governance’ covers the entire gamut of the authority of the state including 
defense.  According to the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English the term 
‘plenary’ denotes “(of the power of government) complete; without limit”, and according to 
the Oxford Concise Dictionary, ‘entire, absolute, unqualified’. The document refers to the 
term ‘regional administration’ but what is meant by implication is administration of the 
region. 
    
 The LTTE proposal for ISGA, in effect, goes beyond the Federal formula.   After 
the Third Round of Talks between the UNF government and the LTTE in Oslo it was 
declared that  ‘both parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal 
self determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil speaking people, based on a 
federal structure within a united Sri Lanka’.  After the talks, Minister G.L. Peiris appeared 
before the state television and hailed this as a ‘paradigm shift’.  However, when the LTTE 
prepared its counter-proposals for an interim administration, there is no mention of the term 
federal or even confederation, let alone devolution, in the entire document.  In brief, the 
federal principle implies the dispersion of state power between the general and several 
regional governments where citizens will come under two tiers of government within one 
sovereign state. In the federal system of two-tier governments, the center is responsible for 
things common to the entire state and retains functions that are best executed at one place.  
In the proposed ISGA there is no link or role what so ever to the Sri Lankan Government 
except appointing some members to the ISGA.      
 
Exclusion of the Sri Lankan State from the North and the East 
There is no role for the institutional expressions of the Sri Lankan state in the 
proposed ISGA.  In effect, all the institutional apparatus of executive, legislative and 
judicial functions of the state are excluded from the North and East.  Nirupama 
Subramanian of The Hindu observes that the Government of Sri Lanka figures in the 
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 Proposals only in three contexts: ‘the vacation of Tamil lands by the Sri Lankan armed 
forces and compensation by the Sri Lankan state to those whose lands were taken over by 
the armed forces during the War; to state that the ISGA will control all funds allocated by 
the Sri Lankan Government to it and those flowing to the Sri Lankan Government from 
international aid agreements for the North-East; and in the composition of the ISGA, in 
which there is a provision for government representation.’ 9  The proposal makes provision 
for the establishment of separate institutions for the administration of justice for the North- 
and East and ‘judicial powers shall be vested with in such institution’.  The document is 
silent as to whether these institutions come under the Sri Lankan Supreme Court. There is 
no reference to the judicial structure presently in operation in the North and East. The ISGA 
has powers to borrow internally and externally and ‘provide guarantees and indemnities, 
receive aid directly, and engage in or regulate internally and external trade’.  Accordingly, 
the Central Bank of Sri Lanka is effectively excluded in its functions in the North –East.  
‘The Northeast General fund’ will be established under the control of ISGA and all the 
funds, loans and grants will be under its control.  The Government of Sri Lanka is to make 
contributions from the consolidated fund on the recommendation of the Financial 
Commission appointed by the ISGA. But the Government of Sri Lanka has no any control 
over the expenditure of such funds. The ISGA appoints its own Auditor General sidelining 
effectively the Auditor General who is functioning under the Article 213 and 214 of the 
Constitution.         
 
The Eastern Question  
The ISGA offers no viable plan to deal with the complexities in the Eastern province, 
especially, the Muslim dimension, and to incorporate all the stakeholders in the East on the 
basis of equality and partnership.  Any political arrangement, interim or otherwise, which 
does not provide adequate guarantees and safeguards for the security of all the three 
communities living there, would usher in a new phase of calamity and disaster. In fact, the 
Eastern Province is a multi-ethnic entity in the real sense of the word where all three 
communities lived side by side historically.  Hence, it is a test case for accommodation and 
                                                 
9 Nirupama Subramanian, ‘An interim separate state’, The Hindu,  02.11. 2003. 
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 compromise in reaching a political settlement to the ethnic problem.  Any political 
arrangement that does not accept ethnic diversity of the Eastern Province and make all the 
three Communities, especially the Muslims who constitutes well over one thirds of the 
population of the province, as stake-holders of the process is doomed to fail.  The ISGA 
extends the majoritarian practice to the Eastern Province and makes necessary provisions to 
place it under the firm control of the LTTE.  One may wonder how the same principle 
which has been challenged in the South will be applicable in the East.  It is obvious that the 
cry of the LTTE for ‘territorial unity of the historical Tamil homeland’ has been put into 
practice in the proposed the ISGA.  Irrespective of whether they come from South or North 
the exclusive and traditional homeland concepts (‘Sinhala Buddhist’ or ‘Traditional Tamil 
Homeland’) as presented by nationalist projects are not tenable in a multiethnic context and 
they create more problems than solving them. Even though the history is often used to 
justify such political projects, the past historical evidences point to the diversity of 
historical processes. 
However, in deciding contemporary political issues what is more important is the 
present ground realities, not the historical title. The validity of historical title in deciding the 
destiny of a territory was examined by the International Court of Justice in the Western 
Sahara case of 1975. Spanish Sahara (Oro de Rio) was conquered by the Spanish in the 
context of the new imperial scramble of European powers in Africa after 1870 and it had 
been a Spanish colony since 1884. In the wake of the rapid dissolution of remaining 
colonial holdings in Africa, Spain ultimately agreed to hold a referendum in Western 
Sahara in 1975. At this point both Morocco and Mauritania claimed the territory on the 
basis of historical title and objected to the referendum.  In this situation the General 
Assembly decided to refer the case to International Court of Justice to obtain Advisory 
Opinion.10 The Court observed that the Western Sahara was not terra nullius because the 
territory had been inhabited by nomadic people who were socially and politically organized. 
Further, it found that there was no evidence which demonstrated political authority 
                                                 
10 GA Resolution 3239(XXIX),13 December 1974.   Advisory Opinion was sought on two 
matters: firstly, whether Western Sahara was terra nullius prior to Spanish colonization and, 
secondly, if it is not the case, what legal ties existed at this time between the Western 
Sahara and Morocco, on one hand, and Mauritania on the other. 
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 amounting to sovereignty on the part of both Morocco and Mauritania despite some 
Saharan tribes had ties of personal allegiance to Morocco. However, more important was 
the opinion expressed by the judges in relation to self-determination and historical title. 
Judge Dillard declared that; 
It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the 
territory the destiny of the people. Viewed in this perspective it becomes 
almost self-evident that the existence of ancient ‘legal ties’ of the kind 
described in the Opinion, while they may influence some of the projected 
procedures for decolonization, can have only a tangible effects in the 
ultimate choices available to the people11.   
 
In the same vein, the people who live presently in the East must be allowed to decide the 
political future of the territory. The mechanisms in built in the Interim Arrangement offered 
in the Constitution Bill of August 2000 in relation to the East provide a good example for 
such arrangement.  In other words, some form of consociation arrangement among all the 
stake-holders provides the key to way out.  
         
De-commissioning and De-militarization  
 Another important aspect ignored in the ISGA is demilitarization including 
decommissioning of arms.  Usually, negotiated political settlements to armed conflicts 
require militant groups to demobilize their soldiers and to give up arms in return for 
political power in an agreed order.  It is indeed a vexed issue and a complex process 
because of ‘pathologies of leadership’, to borrow a term from S.J. Stedman, in any conflict 
situation12.  Nevertheless, if it to be credible, the interim arrangement must address the 
issues of mutual and balanced demilitarization. As Chris Smith observed ‘(R)ecent events 
in Northern Ireland reflect the crucial political importance of weapons decommissioning 
and the extent to which disarmament can quickly become the key aspect of an advanced 
peace process. Certainly, this will also be the case in Sri Lanka and will consistently test 
the LTTE commitment to a political peace process’.13    It goes without saying that one of 
                                                 
11ICJ Reports 1975, p.122. 
12 Stephen John Steadman, “Negotiations and Mediation in Internal Conflict” in Michael E. Brown, ed., 
International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge. Mass: The MIT Press, 1996). 
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 the key problems that need to be addressed in the interim arrangement is the resettlement of 
internally-displaced.  In this respect, the issue of rolling back of High Security Zones (HSZ) 
will become a critical matter that needs to be addressed without delay.  However, the issue 
of high security zones cannot be addressed in isolation and it must be a part of a broader 
plan of de-escalation where decommissioning of arms constitutes an integral element. Even 
if the composition of the proposed ISGA is changed to reflect the ethnic and political 
plurality of the North and East as long as one group is armed, it is not possible for the 
interim administration to be democratic.  In order to ensure a democratic political 
environment the civil administrator and the armed carder need to be separated.  All other 
Tamil political parties, who do not toe the line of the LTTE, fear that without 
decommissioning of arms any interim arrangement under the hegemony of the LTTE would 
usher in an authoritarian regime in the North and East at the expense of all democratic 
values.  During the long years of conflict the people in the North and East have been 
deprived of democratic structures and processes enjoyed by the people in the South.  Once 
the interim process is set in motion, how can it be possible to deny the people in the North 
and East the democratic practices prevailing in rest of the country?  
 
Sovereignty of the State and the Control of Marine and Off-shore Resources  
 The provisions relating to the marine and off-shore resources in the proposals 
impinge directly on the sovereignty of Sri Lankan State, not in the Westphalian sense but in 
terms of international legal definition. The proposed ISGA, to quote the text, ‘shall have 
control over the marine and off shore resources of adjacent seas and the power to regulate 
access thereto’.  Marine and off-shore resources of a country and the power to regulate 
access to them squarely come under the purview of the external dimension of sovereignty 
of the state. In discussing internal and external elements of sovereignty Barry Buzan 
pointed out that states may share their internal sovereignty with non-state entities but never 
                                                                                                                                                    
13 Chris Smith, In the Shadow of a Cease-fire: The Impacts of Small Arms Availability and Misuse in Sri 
Lanka, Small Arms Survey-Occasional Paper No. 11, Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studiers, 
October 2003, p. 6. 
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 the external sovereignty14.  Since the state is a legal abstraction, its concrete existence 
depends on the assignment of such status to it by other international actors. The 
international regimes that set the rules, norms and the decision-making procedures in the 
international political arena recognize only the states as the unit of behavior. This is 
precisely why the states cannot share its external sovereignty with non-state entities.  
 
 Accordingly, once ISGA is established the two thirds of Sri Lankan Territorial 
waters will be controlled by a non-state entity where the Sri Lankan State does not have any 
say because all the ‘plenary powers’ are vested with it. It will have very serious 
implications on international shipping in our territorial waters.  All the procedures and 
decision making mechanisms relating to the international shipping take only the sovereign 
state as the unit of behaviour. It should be noted that concurrent with the jurisdiction with 
the Flag state the coastal states also have some degree of control over vessels in its 
territorial waters.  These powers of the costal states are now written into a number of IMO 
conventions, such as SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea) and 
into the Law of the Sea Convention. Sri Lanka as a sovereign state can not simply abandon 
these obligations. The Article 111 of the UNCLOS authorizes only the navies of the 
sovereign states the right of ‘Hot Pursuit’. 
  
 The term  ‘off-shore resources of adjacent seas’ covers the territorial waters, the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and also the continental shelf .  According to the Third Low of 
the Sea Convention (UNCLOS-III), continental shelf of the coastal state comprises the 
submerged prolongation of the land territory of the coastal state – the seabed and subsoil of 
the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea to the outer edge of the continental 
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles where the outer edge of the continental 
margin does not extend up to that distance. The continental margin consists of the seabed 
and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise.  Sri Lanka can claim part of the Bengal Deep 
Sea Fan which is considered the largest tectonic element on earth.  It extends from the 
                                                 
14 See, Barry Buzan, People, State, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-cold 
War Era. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991).   
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 Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta, past Sri Lanka and beyond Equator. In addition to the seabed 
oil resources, this seabed and sub soil is highly endowed with other mineral resources. In 
the view of the possibility of nearing the depletion of land-based mineral resources, the 
exploitation of off-shore mineral resources will acquire added importance in the future. 
According to article 76 of the UNCLOS-III, India and Sri Lanka have to establish outer 
limit of our continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles by establishing the foot of the 
continental slope by meeting the requirements stated for the thickness of sedimentary rocks, 
distance and depth criteria. Both Sri Lanka and India have already embarked on a 
coordinated effort to demarcate outer limit and submit their respective claims to the United 
Nations by 2005.  The grave repercussions of the provisions giving authority over the 
marine and off shore resources of adjacent seas to the ISGA should be understood when in 
conjunction with the other provisions which empower the ISGA to enter into any 
agreement with any other party.  
 
The powers bestowed upon the ISGA to regulate the access to marine and off-shore 
resources compels it to have a naval arm of its own to execute this responsibility.  Even 
though the Proposal does not mention directly to the Sea Tigers, the sea wing of the LTTE, 
the above provisions legitimize the Sea Tigers by giving them a ‘lawful’ role and, in effect, 
strips off the Sri Lankan Navy from its responsibilities in the North-Eastern waters. The 
legitimization of the Sea Tigers in the North-Eastern waters would definitely have grave 
implications on Sri Lankan national security. It is well known that the North-Eastern waters 
are used by the LTTE to smuggle arms to the Island. The LTTE maintains links with the 
clandestine international arms trade network and its arms supply route lies via the North-
Eastern waters.  The Small Arms Survey published by the Geneva based Graduate Institute 
of International Studies observed: ‘The illegal procurement system developed by the LTTE 
over the course of the conflict is perhaps the most innovative and impressive ever witnessed 
for a non-state organization.  Backed by expatriate Tamils willing to provide money and 
contacts, the  LTTE was able to trawl many countries in Southeast Asia- Bangladesh, Hong 
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 Kong, India, Myanmar and Singapore- for the weapons and non-military equipment it 
required to sustain the civil war.15
 
 There were many confirmed evidence on LTTE attempt to smuggle more 
sophisticated weapon systems to the island across the sea during the period of ceasefire.  To 
cite an example, the Russian Ambassador in Sri Lanka, in a ‘non-paper’  submitted by to 
the Foreign Ministry in May 2003, intimated  that members of the LTTE in Laos 
(Vientiane) approached the representative  of the Russian state organization 
Rosboronoexport to procure small arms, portable anti-aircraft missile complex (IGLA), 
communication means and other types of Russian weapons.16  The recognition of its Sea 
Tigers and the free access to waters remained a long-time demand of the LTTE.    It should 
be noted that when the Scandinavian Monitors (SLMM) presented a proposal in the earlier 
occasion to recognize the Sea Tigers and allocate sea space for their firing practice during 
the ceasefire the objections were so strong that it was not even discussed. As Chris Pattern, 
the External Relations Commissioner of the European Union, observed, the LTTE still has 
‘a long way to go to change from rebel outfit into legitimate political group’. He is further 
reported to have stated ‘We want to be absolutely sure that the LTTE have given up 
violence. There is a difference between Kalashnikovs and the ballot-box and we want it to 
be absolutely clear that they have stopped murdering people for political ends’17.  The 
implications of assigning the Sea Tigers of the powers to control the ‘adjacent seas’ for the 
national security need to understood in this background.        
 
Regional Security Implications  
The implications of the control over marine and off-shore resources of adjacent seas 
and power to regulate access by ISGA stretch beyond the national parameters.  The 
legitimization of the third naval force in the waters between India and Sri Lanka is a matter 
                                                 
15Chris Smith, In the Shadow of a Cease-fire: The Impacts of Small Arms Availability and Misuse in Sri 
Lanka, Small Arms Survey-Occasional Paper No. 11, Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studiers, 
October 2003.  pp. vii and 11. 
16 Sunday Times, March 9, 2003. 
17 The Telegraph (Calcutta), November 22, 2003. 
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 of grave concern for India.  Given the fact that the proposed ISGA is in reality a LTTE 
Authority, if the provisions relating to ‘Marine and Off-shore resource’ are implemented, 
the security architecture of the South Asia has to take into account the emergence of 
another navy which is controlled by a non-state entity in the South Asian waters. India has 
a legitimate right to be concerned on this matter as the Indian Navy has to share the 
maritime boundary between Indian and Sri Lankan territorial waters with the Sea Tigers. 
Sri Lanka as a sovereign state located in South Asian geo-strategic sub system has definite 
obligation in relation to the regional peace and stability.  Any lapses on the part of Sri 
Lankan state in fulfilling these obligations in the context of the regional security 
architecture create serious destabilizing effects on entire South Asia.  
       
 Another important issue is the control of Trincomalee.  It is not a just another 
harbour located on the eastern shore-line. The strategic value of Trincomalee in relation to 
the defense and security of the entire island is enormous.  The Headquarter of the EastCom 
of the Sri Lankan Navy is located there and it is the nerve center for all the naval operations 
in the eastern waters. Even in any Federal set-up such strategic locations essential for 
national defense come under the purview of the central government. When one considers 
all the inferences of the provisions of the Proposal together, it is obvious that Trincomalee 
harbour will be under the exclusive control of the ISGA.  In view of the sensitivities and 
concerns of the regional and extra-regional powers over the way in which Trincomalee 
relates to their strategic planning, the fabric of strategic linkages of Trincomalee needs to 
be decided carefully without leaving any room for a security dilemma syndrome. In this 
context, the control of Trincomalee by the LTTE is not acceptable to any regional or extra-
regional power.  In such eventuality, its national and regional implications for peace and 
stability in the respective spheres would be far more profound, which Sri Lanka will be 
compelled to grapple with.          
 
Clear the route:  To Where? 
 The interim arrangement must clear the route for a final negotiated settlement.  
Where is the proposed ISGA heading? If the proposal for an ISGA endorses the existence 
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 of a separate army, navy and financial powers to borrow internally and externally, to 
control external trade, to enter into agreements and contracts with any other entity and 
exclusive control over funds from the donor countries and international agencies, could the 
corresponding final political settlement be anything less than a separate sovereign state?  
The legal experts of the LTTE are very well aware of the fact that obtaining international 
recognition after secession is not that easy. According to international conventions and 
practices the recognition of new states is very restricted. The territories designated by the 
United Nations as non-self-governing (colonial) units can exercise their right of self 
determination through plebiscite as in the case of East Timor. Further, voluntary and 
consensual separation of con-federal or federal entities are permitted as in the cases of 
separation of  Senegal from the Mali Republic in 1960, Jamaica from the West Indian 
Federation in 1961  and Singapore from Malaysia in 1965 and  Checks and Slovaks  (‘the 
velvet divorce’)  in 1993.   The Bangladesh case presents genocide and oppression on 
ethnic grounds could be the valid reason for session.  Even then, as Onyeonoro Kanenu 
stated, ‘It must be demonstrated that all other political arrangements capable of ensuring 
the aggrieved group a measure of self-determination short of outright independence have 
been exhausted or repudiated by the dominant majority’.18  The Soviet and the Yugoslav 
experiences endorse secession on the ground of the disintegration of the former state. In the 
wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the European Union, in the Alma Ata 
Declaration on 16 December 1991, emphasized that the new states emerged not as a result 
of secession but of dissolution of earlier political entity and set out a number of conditions 
including, inter alia,  pre-existing republics constituted the territorial basis of dissolution 
and ethnic self-determination within the republics would not be recognized; and Rights of 
national minorities must be respected within the broader framework of democracy and 
human rights.  In the case of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the European community 
established an Arbitration Commission to deal with the issue of secession in case by case 
and it also took the same line in recommending the acceptance of new states in former 
Yugoslavia.  In this context, the proposed ISGA would clear the ground in many respects.  
                                                 
18  Onyeonoro Kamenu, ‘Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: An OAU Dilemma, Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 12 (1974), p. 361. 
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 Firstly it will establish the LTTE control over all the aspects of governance (plenary 
powers) in the area and get the government administrative machinery out of the North and 
the East.  Secondly it will establish the borders of the ISGA in line with the present 
Provincial boundaries.  Thirdly Trincomalee will be developed as the center of the LTTE 
administrative control in the North and the East. And fourthly, it will neutralize 
international opposition, especially that of India, against the violation of territorial integrity 
of a sovereign state by adopting a piecemeal approach to the separate state. After four years, 
the formal recognition of Eelam will be requested as a fait accompli. The proposed ISGA 
will set the ground for it gradually and systematically.  After five years of the Agreement 
coming into force ‘if no final settlement has been reached  and implemented by the end of 
said period of five years’ an election will be held by an independent Election Commission 
appointed by the ISGA under international observation.  It is nothing but the registration of 
the right to secede. How can the fault of not reaching a final settlement be solely attributed 
to the government of Sri Lanka?  Unless and until it is acceptable to the LTTE they can 
differ reaching at a final settlement and go for the Elections in which they have full control. 
Compromise and the accommodation must be the basis for any solution. This clause 
precludes the LTTE from making any sort of compromise and accommodation in reaching 
a final settlement.            
 
 Future Direction of Negotiations  
 What would be the future direction of the peace process in Sri Lanka in this 
context?  It should be discussed against the background of the present impasse in the  peace 
process which was, to a larger extent, a consequence of an absence of a clear strategy on 
the part of the UNF government on how to deal with the LTTE and linking the peace 
process to its political survival. As a result the process set in motion by the UNF 
government in early 2002 with much media hype had struck in a serious crisis by April 
2003.  Almost all the joint structures and institutions established in the process of 
negotiations to carry out various functions related to the peace process were defunct. The 
GOSL has lost by default any independent initiative of its own and the LTTE had been 
given the opportunity to decide the agenda unilaterally in line with its political objectively.  
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 The area of maneuverability of the Sri Lankan state has been curtailed drastically as a result 
of the failure of the UNF government to safeguard the vital security interests of the state. 
Without any clear direction just harping on the process ended up in disarray of the peace 
process, possible loosing another opportunity that history might never offer us again.  This 
situation requires a redirection of the peace process urgently.  
One stark reality highlighted by the proposed ISGA is that the LTTE has not yet 
changed its political objective of achieving a  separate state of Tamil Eelam despite the 
repeated joint-statements declaring its intentions ‘to explore a solution based on federal 
structure within a united Sri Lanka’. It is pertinent at this point to mention that in every 
such statements the LTTE agreed just to explore the possibility of finding  a solution based 
on federal structure only with a number of qualifications, and it was careful enough not to 
commit itself firmly to a federal solution.   The UNF government, however, seemed over 
jubilant with these statements and interpreted them as to effect that LTTE has moved away 
from its separatist flank. But the LTTE was often straightforward, if not blunt, in 
articulating its objectives. In addressing Tamil expatriates in Düsseldorf in Germany after 
the 5th round of Talks held in Berlin in February 2003, for example, Blasingham  
acknowledged candidly that: ‘This journey ( i.e. peace talks) is a diplomatic move. We are 
moving towards a goal. We can not continue war for a long period. Our fighters and the 
people want an interlude. We need this to build the economy and the quality of life of our 
people’.19  Quite naturally, such statements created apprehensions as to true intentions of 
the LTTE in attending in the peace talks. But in every occasion the UNF government not 
only ignored such statements but also came forward to justify them by highlighting the 
LTTE’s need to pacify its constituency. At the same time, the verbiage of Minister G.L 
Peiris at the official press briefings created undue expectations among the people for a 
possibility of an early political settlement of the conflict while camouflaging its real 
difficulties and challenges.  Even as late as late July 2003, after presenting the third set of 
proposals for ‘Provincial Administrative Structure’ by the LTTE, Minister G.L. Peiris told 
reporters that ‘As far as the progress is concerned we have every reason to be satisfied that 
                                                 
19 The Sunday Times, February 16, 2003.  
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 the process is moving forward. The developments are positive’20. Ultimately the UNF 
government became a victim of its own self-proclaimed prophesy.  
 
The Changes in the LTTE Strategy 
 Even though the LTTE has not moved from its earlier separatist flank they are now 
ready to pursue its objectives in a political-constitutional sphere. It is a positive 
development. The rules and norms of behavior relevant and the competencies required in 
the politico-constitutional spheres are quite different from those relevant and required in the 
politico-military sphere. Therefore, the LTTE is compelled to modify its modus operandi.  
In order to utilize this change to push the LTTE towards a positive direction further and 
drive them into the democratic political process it is essential for Sri Lankan government to 
have a clear vision and a proper strategy.  
 
By the time the UNF assumed power in 2002 the LTTE had been compelled to 
change its strategy from politico-military front to politico-constitutional front. It was partly 
due to the strategies carried out by the earlier Peoples’ Alliance regime and also partly due 
to the changed international and domestic situation.  According to Chris Smith six main 
issues are relevant to understand the shift in the LTTE strategy.  The second generation of 
Tamil expatriates has become less and less interested in the ideology of Eelam and 
consequently the reduction of remittances. The stalemate of the war created a no-win 
situation for the both parties and the Tamil population became extremely war-weary. In 
addition, in  Chris Smith’s words, ‘the global concern over the proliferation of illegal 
SALW (small arms and light weapons) may yet come to have an adverse effects upon the 
LTTE weapons procurement programme’21.   Consequent to a serious of assassinations by 
the LTTE, the international support for the Tamil cause has been on the wane and the 
weight of international opinion has shifted in an unexpected but unequal way to favour the 
Sri Lankan state. Further more, the global coalition against terrorism following the 9/11 
would have profound implications on the behaviour of the LTTE which had been already 
                                                 
20 The Sunday Times, July 27, 2003. 
21  Chris Smith, op.cit., p. 3. 
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 proscribed as a terrorist organization by a number of countries. In this context, the risk 
involved with the continuation of the armed struggle would entail grave dangers and 
serious repercussions. The changed demography in the island in general and in the North 
and the East especially was a serious concern for the LTTE. ‘The diaspora of Tamils has 
resulted in the migration of 500,000 Tamils overseas, and an additional 200,000 have 
relocated to the south of Sri Lanka.  Overall, this has reduced the Tamils to eight percent of 
the population, from 12 percent at the start of the Conflict.’22 Another important factor 
contributed to influence the LTTE to change emphasis from the bunker to the table is the 
influence of the new expatriate Tamil business community and professionals who back the 
LTTE. These elements operating internationally are much more sensitive to the winds and 
pressures in the international arena despite the fact that the ‘long-distance nationalism’ can 
be a stronger but cushioned poignancy. Whatever may be the reason or combination of 
reasons and conjunctures, there is a shift in the LTTE strategy. How to utilize this shift to 
induce a paradigm shift in LTTE political agenda is the responsibility of the government.  It 
needs a proper reading of the LTTE strategy and a clear perspective with counter-strategy.  
Unfortunately, the UNF government lacked both; its penchant for the goodwill of the LTTE 
at any cost and over-appeasement did not create any compulsion for LTTE to change its 
aims and objectives.             
 
The visible shift of emphasis in LTTE strategy may be a tactical move; but its 
significance cannot be overlooked at any rate. The prevailing ceasefire is one positive 
outcome. This is the longest ceasefire that the people are experiencing since the outbreak of 
the armed conflict. It should not be forgotten that the conflict had ultimately reached a level 
of a frontal warfare with trenches on both sides. The sufferings and destruction created by 
the war became enormous. The entire social and cultural fabric of the country was bleeding. 
The human toll in both sides was very high. Higher the scale and the intensity of the 
conflict, greater the solace brought about by the ceasefire to the people. It was in this 
context that the ceasefire and its continuation, with all the shortcomings, and the retaining 
of the LTTE in the dialogue framework can be considered a positive development.  
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
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 However, the political price that the Sri Lankan state paid to maintain the ceasefire was 
very high. The LTTE has been allowed to gain a status almost in par with the GOSL, 
nationally and internationally and it has been offered openings to build their international 
legitimacy. The LTTE has been provided with the space to acquire the paraphernalia of a 
state in every aspect in the North and the East and it was allowed to extend its weight on 
the civil administration of the state. The government turned a blind eye when the LTTE 
systematically annihilated many other Tamil political leaders in order to justify its claim to 
don the mantle of the sole representative of the Tamils. At the same time the government 
sat mute over extortions, smuggling arms via sea and building up new military camps 
encircling strategic locations such as the Trincomalee.  It was really an unwarranted 
political price because without these the LTTE could have been retained within the 
ceasefire framework. Accordingly, the government has failed to make use of the shift in the 
LTTE strategy to create a solid foundation for a negotiated political settlement by setting 
the peace process on a correct tract. 
  
Now it is high time to come to grips with the realities of the present peace process. 
After twenty months of ceasefire and six rounds of peace talks it was failed to force the 
LTTE to alter its political objectives conceived in the framework of a separate state. 
Nevertheless, the government was able to retain the LTTE within the ceasefire framework. 
There is a long way to go in order to reach a mutually acceptable settlement with the LTTE. 
Such an agreement must be acceptable to all the stakeholders to the conflict. 
 
Present Priorities  
The maintaining the ceasefire regime is an immediate priority despite its serious 
flaws. Many of them are emanating mainly from the shortcomings of the Ceasefire 
Agreement signed between the GOSL and the LTTE in February 2002 which provided the 
basis for the present ceasefire regime. The Ceasefire Agreement was unbalanced and 
structurally flawed. It granted many unwanted concessions to the LTTE without being 
reciprocated.  It marginalized other Tamil political parties operating in the North and East 
rendering them vulnerable to attack by the LTTE.  The role of the people, their forums, 
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 religious and other civil society organizations are a missing element in the present ceasefire 
arrangement. It must be emphasized that the abrogation of the Ceasefire Agreement and 
unilateral withdrawal from the ceasefire will not be a solution to any of these limitations 
and shortcomings. The price has already been paid. The new Freedom Alliance government 
also assured its commitment to the ceasefire and its determination to continue it. The 
ceasefire should not be considered as an end in itself.  In most of the countries with records 
of successful peace processes, such as in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, El Salvador 
and Nicaragua, no ceasefire was in place before the settlement and fighting continued while 
the parties negotiated.  Sri Lankan situation is different as ceasefire is already in place. 
How to minimize the damage caused by the adverse clauses of the Ceasefire Agreement is 
a difficult issue.  Any revision of the clauses in the agreement needs the consent of the 
LTTE.  In case of LTTE reluctance to any such change of the present Ceasefire Agreement, 
a way out is the shortening of the period of the ceasefire regime by expediting discussions 
on core-political issues relating to the settlement and corresponding interim arrangement. 
 
How to induce the LTTE to change its objectives to settle with a mutually 
acceptable political solution is the formidable challenge.  As the LTTE had not abandoned 
its military strategy simply because it entered into a ceasefire agreement, it has not 
abandoned its separatist flank simply because it had presented its political objectives in a 
constitutional sphere. In order to force  LTTE to change its separatist flank it is necessary  
for the Sri Lankan government to be ready, firstly,  with  a viable political construct for  
post-conflict constitutional arrangement as an alternative to the separatist political project 
and, secondly, with  a proper negotiation strategy to deal with the LTTE.  Separatism is 
primarily a political challenge and it should be first defeated on the political plane. The 
proposed alternative political construct must invest power with the people in the region to 
mange their regional affairs, to sustain and promote their ethno-national identities without 
any adverse effects on the unity of the people and the territorial integrity of the state. 
Instead of going alone with labels what is required is to identify a political construct which 
is capable of addressing the challenges that the country confronts in an era marked by 
ethno-political mobilizations.  A system of two-tier governments similar to the Indian 
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 model has proved to be successful in accommodating ethno-political mobilizations in a 
multi-ethnic set-up. However, in addition to the dispersal of ethnic plurality throughout the 
country, the geo-strategic unity of the island, the central mountain range and the pattern of 
water resources and the distribution of natural resources demand strong center also. 
Therefore, a two-tiered political system, with some form of power sharing arrangements at 
the center, between the center and the regions and also within the region itself could be a 
viable solution to the challenge of  separatist political project.  If the parties to the conflict 
agree on principle to such political construct as a solution, an interim arrangement can be 
worked out in line with the agreed framework.      
 
Need for an Alternative Interim Arrangement 
In the course of conflict transformation an interim arrangement could be a useful 
strategic move if it is properly established in a correct context.  Firstly, it is considered an 
appropriate arrangement to address issues in a transitional phase. The transition from 
conflict environment to a post-conflict settlement is a complex process and it creates 
serious security concerns and vulnerabilities for the both side.  An interim arrangement will 
offer some space for the both parties to adjust to the new situation.  Secondly, it will offer 
an opportunity to the both parties to test the bona fide of each other.  In the conflict 
normally each believes the other party is the cause of the conflict. It is not possible to dispel 
mutual suspicion overnight. The fear that the other will utilize the settlement to gain 
monopoly of power prevents both from reaching a settlement. Thirdly, an interim 
arrangement can be used as a training ground for civil administration and democracy to 
militants.  On the battlefront the logic of war determines the behavior. Skills and training 
required for a proper civil administration in democratic environment differ from what was 
useful in war. A good soldier does not necessarily make a good administrator. While there 
is a division of labour in this regard on the part of the state, there is no such division in the 
LTTE. Fourthly, if carefully executed interim arrangement can be used to alleviate fears of 
general public in the conflict-ridden areas and outside.  Building of trust and confidence is 
necessary for the implementation of the post-conflict settlement. The interim phase can be 
utilized to build mutual trust and confidence. Further more, Interim arrangement can be 
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 utilized to dispel fears of the imagined consequences of a settlement before implementing 
the negotiated settlement in toto.  However, in order to reach above benefits of interim 
arrangement in the peace-building process, it must fulfill six conditions. Firstly it should be 
established as a part of an agreed political settlement for a specific period till the 
arrangements are made to implement fully the agreed political settlement. Secondly the 
composition of the interim council should be such that it must include all the stakeholders, 
political and ethnic, enable it to have democratic content and practice.  As has been 
mentioned earlier, even it is composed to reflect the multi-ethnic and multi-party 
complexion of the region, as long as one group is armed, interim administration will not be 
democratic.  Thirdly, it follows that the establishment of interim council must be linked 
with decommissioning of arms. Fourthly, powers and functions of the interim council must 
be clearly delineated and provisions made for the government at the center to execute its 
legitimate functions and responsibilities are to be in place. Fifthly, it should contain in-
build system of checks and balances incorporated within the constitutional framework. 
Finally, any administrative arrangement should take care of the protection of human rights 
of the people in the region. 
 
Challenge of Resuscitating the Peace Process   
Finally, it comes to the issue of resumption of negotiations with the LTTE.  
Consequent to the past strategic errors and blunders of the UNF government in handling the 
peace process the earlier confidence and the support base in the south as well as in the 
North and East for a negotiated settlement has now been eroded considerably. Those who 
oppose the resuming of negotiations with the LTTE at this juncture argue that the LTTE 
has not changed its political objectives even after six rounds of talks.  What the LTTE had 
really done in attending the Peace Talks was to take the UNF government in a ride to get 
closer to the Eelam.  Further, they point out that it is not possible to talk with the LTTE on 
the basis of ISGA as it is not acceptable. In this context, some fundamentals relating to 
negotiations need to be highlighted. First, it is not unusual for parties in the conflict to 
come to negotiations without changing its hard-held positions. They view negotiations as 
another means of achieving the same goal. In the process of negotiations, however, these 
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 positions change depending on the correct strategy adopted. Second, if there is no 
difference it is not necessary to negotiate and bargain over it.  Negotiation is necessary in 
situations only where parties do not agree. Why the Sri Lankan government needs to 
negotiate with the LTTE is not to accept what the LTTE has proposed but to finds a 
mutually acceptable common ground by changing LTTE positions through bargaining. In 
internal ethno-nationalist conflicts, no lasting peace can be achieved on the basis of a 
complete victory or defeat of one part. A negotiated settlement invariably implies to talk 
and bargain.          
 
 With the unilateral withdrawal of the LTTE from the negotiating table in April 2003, 
one phase of negotiations with the LTTE has come to an end. A new and structurally 
different phase in the negotiation process is to evolve with the presentation of LTTE 
proposals for an ISGA.  A new government led by the Freedom Alliance replaced the UNF 
government after the General Elections in April 2004.  The GOSL cannot afford to make 
any more blunders in the next phase of negotiations which will be marked by a long and 
laborious process of hard bargaining. A careful analysis of the positive and negative aspects 
of the peace process under the UNF government is very essential. The weak bargaining 
strength vis-à-vis the LTTE is one of the problems that the GOSL may confront in this 
phase because Sri Lanka has already forfeited its many bargaining tools as a result of the 
appeasement strategy of the UNF government even before the hard bargaining commenced. 
The negotiations must be prepared to endure a rough and stormy ambiance with the 
commencement of bargaining over substantive issues relating to a post-conflict political 
construct.  It is essential for the Sri Lankan government in this phase to view negotiations 
as an integral part of a broader strategy with clear targets, proper tactics, identified mile-
posts, and, more importantly, strong fall back positions.  
 
Conclusion 
 The sharp political brinkmanship that the LTTE had excelled in lately has been 
illustrated once again by the way in which the LTTE presented its proposals for an Interim 
Self-Governing Authority.  In the context of the present impasse in the negotiations, the 
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 challenges  before the new Freedom Alliance government in Colombo in guiding the peace 
process in a proper direction so as to a reach a mutually acceptable solution to the ethnic 
conflict are enormous. In order to achieve this tall goal a sophisticated approach with a 
clear political vision is necessary.  In order to develop a proper strategy, not only to deal 
with the LTTE effectively but also in relation to the negotiated political settlement, a 
broader southern political consensus, reinforced by bi-partisan approach, is an essential 
requirement. 
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Appendix 
 
THE PROPOSAL BY THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM  
ON BEHALF OF THE TAMIL PEOPLE  
FOR AN AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH  
AN INTERIM SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY  
FOR THE NORTHEAST OF THE ISLAND OF SRI LANKA  
 
Consistent with the principles of the rule of law, the human rights and equality of all 
persons, and the right to self-determination of Peoples,  
 
Determined to bring lasting peace to all persons of the island of Sri Lanka,  
 
Acknowledging with appreciation the services of the Royal Norwegian Government, the 
Norwegian People, and the international community in attempting to bring peace to the 
island,  
 
Recognizing that a peaceful resolution is a real possibility, despite the challenging history 
of the peace process between the Tamil people and the Sinhala people.  
 
Determined to establish an interim self-governing authority for the NorthEast region and 
to provide for the urgent needs of the people of the NorthEast by formulating laws and 
policies and, effectively and expeditiously executing all resettlement, rehabilitation, 
reconstruction, and development in the NorthEast, while the process for reaching a final 
settlement remains ongoing.  
 
Being aware that the history of the relations between the Tamil People and the Sinhala 
People has been a process of broken promises and unilateral abrogation, by successive 
governments of Sri Lanka, of pacts and agreements solemnly entered into between the 
government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the elected representatives of the Tamil People,  
 
Bearing in mind that successive Governments of Sri Lanka have perpetrated persecution, 
discrimination, State violence and State-orchestrated violence against the Tamil People,  
 
Noting that the Tamil people mandated their elected representatives to establish an 
independent sovereign, secular State for the Tamil people in the elections subsequent to the 
Vaddukoddai Resolution of 1976,  
 
Bearing in mind that the Tamil armed struggle as a measure of self-defense and as a means 
for the realisation of the Tamil right to self-determination arose only after more than four 
decades of non-violent and peaceful constitutional struggle proved to be futile and due to 
the absence of means to resolve the conflict peacefully,  
 
Recalling that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) first took measures towards 
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peace by unilaterally declaring the ceasefire in December, 2000 and again in December, 
2001, opening highways, facilitating trade and the free movement of people, and entering 
into peace negotiations in good faith in the hope of creating an environment conducive to 
the return of normalcy and a just resolution of the conflict,  
 
Taking Note of the political courage of the present GOSL in reciprocating to the 2001 
cease-fire, 
 
Realizing that the war in the island of Sri Lanka was principally confined to the NorthEast, 
resulting in the destruction of the social, economic, administrative, and physical 
infrastructure of that area, and that the NorthEast still remains the region in the island of 
Sri Lanka affected by war,  
 
Recognising that the majority of the Tamil People in the NorthEast, by their actions in the 
general elections held in the year 2000, gave their mandate acknowledging the LTTE as 
their authentic representative,  
 
Knowing that the LTTE exercises effective control and jurisdiction over the majority of the 
NorthEast area of the island of Sri Lanka,  
 
Realising that reaching a final negotiated settlement and the implementation thereof is 
expected to be a long process,  
 
Affirming the necessity for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons 
and their urgent need for unimpeded access to their homes and secure livelihoods at land 
and sea in the NorthEast,  
 
Mindful that institutions and services provided by the GOSL have proved to be inadequate 
to meet the urgent needs of the people of the NorthEast,  
 
Recognising the failure of the Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian and 
Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN) and other Sub-Committees formed during the peace 
negotiations, which failure was due to the composition of such Sub-Committees, which 
repeatedly led to inaction,  
 
Acknowledging the recognition by the GOSL of the necessity for an Interim Authority, as 
mentioned in its 2000 election manifesto,  
 
Realising that maintenance of law and order is an essential pre-requisite for a just and free 
society,  
 
Recognising the need for raising revenue to meet the urgent needs for the Resettlement, 
Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development of the NorthEast region, which has been 
devastated by war, and for the carrying out of any function of Government,  
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Recognising the importance of control over land in resettlement, rehabilitation, 
reconstruction and development,  
 
Mindful that the Tamils did not participate in the making of the 1972 and 1978 
constitutions, which institutionalized discrimination and denied them an effective role in 
the decision-making process,  
 
Noting the practice in international relations over the last decade of solving conflicts 
between Peoples through agreement between the parties to the conflict on terms of equality 
and through innovative and imaginative measures, 
 
Relying on international precedents for establishing interim governing arrangements in 
war-torn countries having the force of law based solely on pacts or agreements between the 
warring parties recognized by the international community,  
 
Noting that measures such as the Ceasefire Agreement, including the role of the Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), and, the establishment of the SIHRN and the NorthEast 
Reconstruction Fund (NERF) constitute valid precedents for making such arrangements,  
 
Wherefore, the Parties, namely the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Government 
of Sri Lanka, hereby agree to the following provisions:  
 
1. Interim Self-Governing Authority  
 
An Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) shall be established comprised of the eight 
districts namely: Amparai, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, 
Trincomalee and Vavuniya in the NorthEast, until a final negotiated settlement is reached 
and implemented.  
Representatives of the Muslim community have the right to participate in formulation of 
their role in the ISGA.  
2. Composition of the ISGA  
2.1. The ISGA shall consist of such number of members as may be determined by the 
Parties to this Agreement.  
2.2. The composition of the ISGA shall be:  
2.2.a. Members appointed by the LTTE,  
2.2.b. Members appointed by the GOSL, and  
2.2.c. Members appointed by the Muslim community in the NorthEast.  
2.3. The number of members will be determined to ensure:  
2.3.a. An absolute majority of the LTTE appointees in the ISGA.  
2.3.b. Subject to (a) above, the Muslim and Sinhala Communities in the NorthEast 
shall have representation in the ISGA.  
2.4. The Chairperson shall be elected by a majority vote of the ISGA and shall serve as 
the Chief Executive of the ISGA.  
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2.5. The Chairperson shall appoint the Chief Administrator for the NorthEast and such 
other officers as may be required to assist in the performance of his/her duties. The 
Chairperson shall have the powers to suspend or terminate any such appointment.  
 
3. Elections  
 
The provisions of Clauses 2.2 and 2.3 shall continue until elections for the ISGA are held. 
Such elections shall be held at the expiry of five years of the coming into force of this 
Agreement, if no final settlement has been reached and implemented by the end of the said 
period of five years. An independent Election Commission, appointed by the ISGA, shall 
conduct free and fair elections in accordance with international democratic principles and 
standards under international observation.  
 
4. Human Rights  
 
The people of the NorthEast shall be accorded all rights as are provided under international 
human rights law. Every law, regulation, rule, order or decision of the ISGA shall conform 
to internationally accepted standards of human rights protection. There shall be an 
independent Human Rights Commission, appointed by the ISGA, which shall ensure the 
compliance with all such human rights obligations. The Commission will seek the 
assistance of international human rights bodies to facilitate the rapid establishment of an 
effective regime for protecting human rights. The Commission shall be entitled to receive 
petitions from any individual person, award compensation to any such affected person, and 
ensure that such person’s rights are restored.  
 
5. Secularism  
 
No religion shall be given the foremost place in the NorthEast.  
 
6. Prohibition against Discrimination  
 
The ISGA shall ensure that there is no discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, 
national or regional origin, age or gender in the NorthEast.  
 
7. Prevention of Bribery and Corruption.  
 
The ISGA shall ensure that no bribery or corruption is permitted in or under its 
administration.  
 
8. Protection of All Communities  
 
No law, regulation, rule, order or decision that confers a privilege or imposes a disability on 
any community, which is not conferred or imposed on any other community, shall be made 
concerning culture or religion. 
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9. Jurisdiction of the ISGA.  
 9.1. The ISGA shall have plenary power for the governance of the NorthEast 
including powers in relation to resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and 
development, including improvement and upgrading of existing services and 
facilities (hereinafter referred to as RRRD), raising revenue including imposition of 
taxes, revenue, levies and duties, law and order, and over land.  
 
These powers shall include all powers and functions in relation to regional 
administration exercised by the GOSL in and for the NorthEast.  
9.2. The detailed modalities for the exercise of such powers and the performance of 
such functions shall be subject to further discussion by the parties to this 
agreement.  
 
10. Separation of Powers  
 
Separate institutions for the administration of justice shall be established for the NorthEast, 
and judicial powers shall be vested in such institutions. The ISGA shall take appropriate 
measures to ensure the independence of the judges.  
Subject to Clauses 4 (Human Rights) and 22 (Settlement of Disputes), of this Agreement, 
the institutions created under this clause shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to 
resolve all disputes concerning the interpretation and implementation of this agreement and 
any other disputes arising in or under this agreement or any provision thereof.  
 
11. Finance  
 
The ISGA shall prepare an annual budget.  
There shall be a Financial Commission consisting of members appointed by the ISGA. The 
members should have distinguished themselves or held high office in the fields of finance, 
administration or business. This Commission shall make recommendations as to the 
amount out of the Consolidated Fund to be allocated to the NorthEast. The GOSL shall 
make its good faith efforts to implement the recommendation.  
The ISGA will, giving due consideration to an equitable distribution, determine the use of 
funds placed at its disposal. These funds shall include the NorthEast General Fund, the 
NorthEast Reconstruction Fund (NERF) and the Special Fund.  
The GOSL agrees that any and all of its expenditures in or for the NorthEast shall be 
subject to the control of the ISGA.  
11.1. NorthEast General Fund  
 
The NorthEast General Fund shall be under the control of ISGA and shall consist 
of:  
11.1.a. The proceeds of all grants and loans made by the GOSL to the ISGA and the 
proceeds of all other loans made to the ISGA.  
11.1.b. All allocations by the GOSL from agreements with states, institutions and/or 
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other organizations earmarked in any such agreements for the NorthEast.  
11.1.c. All other receipts of the ISGA, other than the funds specified below.  
 
11.2. NorthEast Reconstruction Fund  
 
The NERF shall continue to exist in its present form except that control over it 
will be transferred to the ISGA.  
All grants given for the reconstruction of the NorthEast, will be received through 
the NERF. Utilization of resources from NERF will be directly determined and 
supervised by the ISGA.  
11.3. Special Fund  
 
All loans and any grants which cannot be channeled through the NERF for the 
specific purpose of RRRD will be received into the Special Fund. As in the case 
of other Funds, the ISGA shall control the Special Fund.  
 
12. Powers to Borrow, Receive Aid and Trade.  
 
The ISGA shall have powers to borrow internally and externally, provide guarantees and 
indemnities, receive aid directly, and engage in or regulate internal and external trade.  
 
13. Accounting and Auditing of Funds.  
 
13.1. The ISGA shall appoint an Auditor General.  
13.2. All Funds referred to in this Agreement shall be operated, maintained and audited 
in accordance with internationally accepted accounting and auditing standards. 
The accounts will be audited by the Auditor General. The auditing of all moneys 
received from international sources shall be subjected to approval by an 
internationally-reputed firm appointed by the ISGA.  
 
14. District Committees.  
 14.1. In the effective exercise of its legislative and executive powers, the ISGA 
may create District Committees to carry out administration in the districts and 
delegate to such Committees, such powers as the ISGA may determine. The 
Chairpersons of such committees shall be appointed by the ISGA from amongst 
its members in order to serve as a liaison between the ISGA and the Committees.  
 14.2. The other members of the Committees shall also be appointed by the ISGA, 
which shall have the powers to suspend or terminate any such appointment. In 
appointing such members, due consideration shall be given to ensure 
representation of all communities.  
 14.3. The Committees will function directly under the ISGA.  
 14.4. The Chief Administrator of the ISGA shall appoint Principal Executive 
Officers in the districts, who shall also function as the Secretaries to the 
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Committees. The Chief Administrator shall have the powers to suspend or 
terminate any such appointment.  
 
 14.5. All activities and functions of the Committees shall be coordinated through 
the respective Secretaries to the Committees.  
 14.6. Sub-committees may also be appointed to facilitate administration.  
  
15. Administration  
 
As part of the exercise of its executive powers the ISGA shall have direction and control 
over any and all administrative structures and personnel in the NorthEast pertaining to the 
powers set out in Clause 9 of this Agreement.  
The ISGA may, at its discretion, create expert advisory committees in necessary areas. 
These areas will include but are not limited to Economic Affairs, Financial Affairs, Judicial 
Affairs, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Affairs, Development of Infrastructure, and 
Essential Services.  
 
16. Administration of Land  
 
Since land is vital to the exercise of the powers set out in Clause 9 (jurisdiction of the 
ISGA), the ISGA shall have the power to alienate and determine the appropriate use of all 
land in the NorthEast that is not privately owned.  
The ISGA shall appoint a Special Commission on Administration of Land to inquire into 
and report on the rights of dispossessed people over land and land subject to encroachment, 
notwithstanding the lapse of any time relating to prescription.  
The ISGA shall determine the term of competencies of the Special Commission.  
 
17. Resettlement of Occupied Lands  
 
The occupation of land by the armed forces of the GOSL, and the denial to the rightful 
civilian owners of unfettered access to such land, is a violation of the norms of international 
law. Such land must be immediately vacated and restored to the possession of the previous 
owners. The GOSL must also compensate the owners for the past dispossession of their 
land.  
The ISGA shall be responsible for the resettlement and rehabilitation of displaced civilians 
and refugees in such lands.  
 
18. Marine and off-shore resources  
 
The ISGA shall have control over the marine and offshore resources of the adjacent seas 
and the power to regulate access thereto. 
 
19. Natural Resources  
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The ISGA will have control over the natural resources in the NorthEast region. Existing 
agreements relating to any such natural resources will continue in force. The GOSL shall 
ensure that all monies due under such agreements are paid to the ISGA. Any future changes 
to such existing agreements should be made with the concurrence of the ISGA. Future 
agreements shall be entered into with the ISGA.  
 
20. Water Use  
 
Upper riparian users of river systems have a duty to ensure that there is a fair, equitable and 
reasonable use of water resources by lower riparian users. The GOSL and the ISGA shall 
ensure that this internationally recognized principle is followed in the use of water 
resources.  
 
21. Agreements and contracts  
 
All future agreements concerning matters under the jurisdiction of the ISGA shall be made 
with the ISGA. Existing agreements will continue, but the GOSL shall ensure that all 
proceeds under such agreements are paid to the ISGA. Any changes to such existing 
agreements should be made with the concurrence of the ISGA.  
 
22. Settlement of Disputes  
 
Where a dispute arises between the Parties to this Agreement as to its interpretation or 
implementation, and it cannot be resolved by any other means acceptable to the Parties 
including conciliation by the Royal Norwegian Government, there shall be an arbitration 
before a tribunal consisting of three members, two of whom shall be appointed by each 
Party. The third member, who shall be the Chairperson of the tribunal, shall be appointed 
jointly by the Parties concerned. In the event of any disagreement over the appointment of 
the Chairperson, the Parties shall ask the President of the International Court of Justice to 
appoint the Chairperson.  
In the determination of any dispute the arbitrators shall ensure the parity of status of the 
LTTE and the GOSL and shall resolve disputes by reference only to the provisions of this 
Agreement.  
The decision of the arbitrators shall be final and conclusive and it shall be binding on the 
Parties to the dispute.  
 
23. Operational Period  
 
This Agreement shall continue until a new Government for the NorthEast, pursuant to a 
permanent negotiated settlement, is established. The Parties will negotiate in good faith to 
reach such a settlement as early as possible.  
Provided, however, that at the end of four years if no final agreement has been reached 
between the Parties to this agreement, both Parties shall engage in negotiations in good 
faith for the purpose of adding, clarifying, and strengthening the terms of this Agreement. 
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